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Abstract
An improvement to the so-called visual veriﬁcation approach is presented. Visual
veriﬁcation is a method for checking the correctness of the behaviour of a reactive or
concurrent system. It shares a great deal of common ground with ordinary formal
state space veriﬁcation, but is more user-friendly. This is because the user does not
need to specify in detail the properties that the system must satisfy to be correct.
Instead, the user only lists the atomic actions that are relevant for the property.
Computer tools are used to obtain a graphical representation which is a summary
of all possible alternative behaviours of the system, and the user then analyses the
result. The improvement presented in this article allows the user to pick a region
of the graphical representation and investigate it in more detail, without being
overwhelmed by the details outside the region. The improvement is illustrated by
analysing the livelocks in a model of the alternating bit protocol.
1 Introduction
In order to improve the quality of concurrent and reactive systems, in partic-
ular for safety-critical applications, several formal veriﬁcation methods have
been developed for ensuring the correctness of the behaviour of the system.
Formal veriﬁcation consists of checking that a formal model of the system
satisﬁes a formal requirement speciﬁcation according to some mathematically
deﬁned notion of “to satisfy”.
Because checking satisfaction is mathematically challenging and therefore
a signiﬁcant burden for the system designer, veriﬁcation researchers have tried
to automate it as much as possible. Unfortunately, veriﬁcation is demanding
also computationally. Fortunately, with a number of ingenious techniques the
researchers have been able to develop veriﬁcation algorithms and tools that
1 Email: ava@cs.tut.fi
2 Email: hvi@cs.tut.fi
3 Email: anpu@cs.tut.fi
c©2002 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
194
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Valmari, Virtanen, Puhakka
are capable of handling many veriﬁcation tasks of practical signiﬁcance. (An
extensive survey of formal veriﬁcation, its fundamental performance problem
and enhanced veriﬁcation algorithms is presented in [12].)
With an automated veriﬁcation method, it suﬃces that the system devel-
oper submits a formal model of the system and the requirement speciﬁcation.
However, in many cases it is very diﬃcult to present a comprehensive require-
ment speciﬁcation. A great diﬃculty here is that one should be able to think
a priori of all possible things that the system might do wrong. This means
that it is diﬃcult to determine beforehand all the requirements that should
be made. On the other hand, if an important requirement is accidentally
forgotten, then a badly incorrect system may pass formal veriﬁcation.
These problems with requirement speciﬁcations led to the development
of an alternative approach called visual veriﬁcation [16]. Visual veriﬁcation
is based on certain theories and algorithms originally developed for ordinary
veriﬁcation, namely the Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [5,11] and
its descendant Chaos-Free Failures Divergences (CFFD) Semantics [17], but
these are applied in a slightly diﬀerent way.
In visual veriﬁcation, to check a behavioural property of the system, the
property needs not be speciﬁed in detail — it suﬃces that the actions (that is,
operations, or execution steps) of the system that are relevant for the property
are pointed out. The chosen actions are called visible actions. Then computer
tools produce a graphical representation of the behaviour of the system ab-
stracted such that only the visible actions, their relations to each other, and
some information for detecting deadlocks and livelocks are shown. It is im-
portant to notice that the representation does not describe just one execution
of the system, but all alternative executions simultaneously, although with a
great deal of detail left out. The user analyses this representation against the
expectations that the user has regarding the behaviour of the system.
In our experience, behavioural properties are often easy to check in this
way without the burden of specifying the property formally beforehand. What
is more, an attempt to fully understand the graphical representation some-
times reveals an error against a necessary correctness property that the user
did not even think of, and would thus not have included in the requirement
speciﬁcation. Section 4.2 contains an example of this.
Therefore, although visual veriﬁcation is perhaps not veriﬁcation in the
strictest sense of the word, in practice it very often produces results that are
at least as reliable and sometimes more reliable than with ordinary veriﬁcation.
Examples of the use of visual veriﬁcation in the development of communication
protocols have been given in [7,13,8].
An example of a diﬀerent kind of visualisation in veriﬁcation is given in
[3]. There, telephone services are speciﬁed with graphical diagrams. A model
checker is used to ﬁnd violations of constraints in these diagrams, and the
relevant parts of the violating paths are shown to the user.
Nothing in this world is perfect. The main drawback of visual veriﬁca-
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tion — in addition to the performance problems that hamper all automatic
veriﬁcation — is that unless the number of the visible actions is kept small,
the graphical representation of the behaviour becomes too big for the user to
comprehend. As was pointed out in [16], the size of the graphical represen-
tation depends crucially on the chosen semantics. The CFFD semantics is
optimal (in a certain well-deﬁned sense) for analysing livelocks, deadlocks and
illegal sequences of visible actions. This has contributed to the fact that we
have been able to apply visual veriﬁcation to interesting tasks, as discussed
above. However, the need for methods of obtaining more useful information
with smaller graphical representations is still obvious.
In this article we develop one such method: context-sensitively visible ac-
tions. Our new method is applicable in a situation where the user has detected
something strange in the behaviour, and wants to investigate the peculiar part
in more detail. More details can be obtained by declaring more actions visible,
but then the graphical representation easily grows too big. Context-sensitive
visibility makes it possible to declare that an action is visible in the peculiar
part and nowhere else. (“Nowhere else” is not precisely true here, but this
issue can be clariﬁed only after presenting the theory.) In this way the user
can investigate the peculiar part in great detail without being overwhelmed
by the details of uninteresting parts of the behaviour of the system.
In Section 2 we recall the background theory underlying this article. Sec-
tion 3 introduces visual veriﬁcation and illustrates it with the aid of an ex-
ample. Use of our new method is illustrated in Section 4, and its theory and
implementation are discussed in Section 5.
2 Background Theory
2.1 Labelled transition system
A labelled transition system (LTS ) is a state-machine-like representation of the
behaviour of a system or its component process. The system interacts with
its environment by executing visible actions. The system may also execute
invisible actions that the environment cannot directly observe. The symbol
“τ” has been reserved to denote all invisible actions.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A labelled transition system is a quadruple (S,Σ,∆, sˆ), where
• S is the set of states,
• Σ is the alphabet, that is, the set of the visible actions ; it is assumed that
τ /∈ Σ,
• ∆ ⊆ S × (Σ ∪ {τ})× S is the set of transitions, and
• sˆ ∈ S is the initial state.
If L is an LTS, then its components are denoted with SL, ΣL, ∆L and sˆL.
Example 2.2 Figure 1 shows four LTSs, Sender, Receiver, Data channel, and
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Fig. 1. The LTSs of the alternating bit protocol.
Ack channel. Together these LTSs comprise a model of the well-known al-
ternating bit protocol of [4]. The purpose of the protocol is to implement a
reliable data transmission link given unreliable channels. Our model covers
only the logic of the protocol, and omits the payload data that is transported.
The LTSs Sender and Receiver model the actual protocol, and the other two
LTSs model the channels.
Sender ﬁrst receives a sending request from the customer by executing a
send-transition. Then it sends a data message augmented with the bit “0”
(sd0) to Receiver through Data channel, and starts to wait for an acknowl-
edgement (ra0). After receiving the acknowledgement, Sender is ready for the
transmission of the next data message, this time using “1” as the value of the
alternating bit. If the acknowledgement does not arrive or arrives too slowly,
Sender makes a timeout with the invisible τ -transition, and sends sd0 another
time. Sender may send sd0 even a third time and, indeed, any number of times.
Receiver declares new messages with rec and sends an acknowledgement
for all messages. The channel processes Data channel and Ack channel take a
message and then either deliver it to the other side, or dispose of the message
via the action lose d or lose a. ✷
2.2 LTS operators
LTSs may be composed together to construct subsystems and systems. The
most important operators for this are parallel composition “ ‖ ” and hiding.
(For more operators, see e.g. [2,5,11,17].)
Deﬁnition 2.3 [Parallel composition] Let L1 = (S1,Σ1,∆1, sˆ1), . . . , Ln =
(Sn,Σn,∆n, sˆn) be LTSs. The parallel composition of L1, . . . , Ln is the LTS
L1 ‖ · · · ‖ Ln = (S,Σ,∆, sˆ) such that Σ = Σ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Σn and sˆ = (sˆ1, . . . , sˆn),
and S and ∆ are deﬁned as the smallest sets such that the following hold.
• Each s ∈ S is an n-tuple s = (s1, . . . , sn) such that s1 ∈ S1 ∧ · · · ∧ sn ∈ Sn.
• sˆ ∈ S.
• Let (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S. If and only if either
· a = τ and ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : (si, τ, s′i) ∈ ∆i ∧
∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n : (j = i⇒ s′j = sj), or
· a ∈ Σ and ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : (a ∈ Σi ∧ (si, a, s′i) ∈ ∆i) ∨ (a /∈ Σi ∧ s′i = si)
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Fig. 2. Subprocesses of the alternating bit protocol and their common actions.
then (s′1, . . . , s
′
n) ∈ S and ((s1, . . . , sn), a, (s′1, . . . , s′n)) ∈ ∆.
In less formal terms, visible transitions synchronise as determined by the
alphabets of the components, and invisible transitions are always executed by
one component at a time.
Deﬁnition 2.4 [Hiding] Let L = (S,Σ,∆, sˆ) be an LTS and A ⊆ Σ. Then
hide A in L is the LTS (S,Σ′,∆′, sˆ), where Σ′ = Σ− A and ∆′ =
{ (s, a, s′) | (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ ∧ a /∈ A } ∪ { (s, τ, s′) | ∃a ∈ A : (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ }.
In other words, hide just changes to τ the labels of any transitions labelled
with an element of A. For simplicity, if A = {a1, . . . , an}, we allow writing
hide a1, . . . , an in L instead of hide {a1, . . . , an} in L.
Example 2.5 The structure of the alternating bit protocol is shown in Fig-
ure 2. The protocol can now be deﬁned as
hide H in ( Sender ‖ Receiver ‖ Data channel ‖ Ack channel ),
where
H = { sd0, sd1, rd0, rd1, sa0, sa1, ra0, ra1, lose d, lose a }.
✷
We will need later in this article also the less common multiple renaming
operator L[A/a]. Here, L is an LTS, a ∈ ΣL, and A is just any nonempty
set of visible action names. The operator replaces each a-transition with |A|
alternative transitions, one for each member of A. The alphabet is changed
accordingly. It is a special case of a more general multiple renaming operator
L[A1/a1, . . . , Ak/ak] that has been discussed at least in [15].
Deﬁnition 2.6 [Multiple renaming] Let L = (S,Σ,∆, sˆ) be an LTS, a ∈ Σ,
and τ /∈ A = ∅. Then L[A/a] is the LTS (S,Σ′,∆′, sˆ), where Σ′ = (Σ−{a})∪A
and ∆′ = { (s, b, s′) | (s, b, s′) ∈ ∆∧b = a }∪{ (s, b, s′) | (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆∧b ∈ A }.
2.3 Strong Bisimilarity
For technical reasons the well-known notion of strong bisimilarity [10] will be
needed.
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Deﬁnition 2.7 The LTSs L1 = (S1,Σ,∆1, sˆ1) and L2 = (S2,Σ,∆2, sˆ2) that
have the same alphabet are (strongly) bisimilar, denoted in this article by
L1 sb L2, if and only if there is a relation “∼” ⊆ S1 × S2 such that the
following hold for every s1, s
′
1 ∈ S1, s2, s′2 ∈ S2, and a ∈ Σ ∪ {τ}:
(i) sˆ1 ∼ sˆ2.
(ii) If s1 ∼ s2 and (s1, a, s′1) ∈ ∆1,
then there is s such that s′1 ∼ s and (s2, a, s) ∈ ∆2.
(iii) If s1 ∼ s2 and (s2, a, s′2) ∈ ∆2,
then there is s such that s ∼ s′2 and (s1, a, s) ∈ ∆1.
The relation “∼” is called strong bisimulation.
2.4 CFFD-Semantics
The notation s−a1a2 · · · an→ s′ means that the system has a ﬁnite execution
(that is, a path in the LTS) that starts at s and leads to s′ such that the se-
quence of the labels of the transitions along the path is precisely a1, a2, . . . , an.
If we want to say that there is some s′ such that s−a1a2 · · · an→ s′ but we do
not want to specify any such s′, we write s−a1a2 · · · an→ . The existence of an
inﬁnite execution from s with the inﬁnite sequence a1, a2, a3, . . . of transition
labels is denoted with s −a1a2a3 · · ·→ . For instance, Data channel has the
inﬁnite execution sˆData channel −sd0 rd0 sd1 lose d sd0 · · ·→ .
If a1, a2, . . . , an are visible actions, the notation s =a1a2 · · · an⇒ s′ means
that there are m ≥ n and b1, b2, . . . , bm such that s −b1b2 · · · bm→ s′ and
the result of removing all τs from b1b2 · · · bm is a1a2 · · · an. The notations
s=a1a2 · · · an⇒ and s=a1a2a3 · · ·⇒ are deﬁned in an analogous way. We say
that a1a2 · · · an is a trace of the system if and only if sˆ =a1a2 · · · an⇒ , and
a1a2a3 · · · is an inﬁnite trace if and only if sˆ=a1a2a3 · · ·⇒ .
We deﬁne a deadlock state as any state without outgoing transitions. Live-
locks may be modelled with the concept of divergence. A state s is divergent,
if and only if an inﬁnite sequence of τ -transitions can be executed from it.
The trace a1a2 · · · an is a divergence trace, if and only if there is a divergent
state s such that sˆ=a1a2 · · · an⇒ s.
Analogously, we could deﬁne deadlock traces as those traces that can lead
to a deadlock state. However, we want our equivalences to be congruences,
which means that a system is guaranteed to remain equivalent when any of its
components is replaced with an equivalent component. The deadlock traces
do not induce a congruence with respect to the parallel composition operator,
and therefore we need the more general notion of stable failures. A stable
failure is a pair (a1a2 · · · an, {b1, b2, . . . , bm}) such that there is a state s such
that sˆ=a1a2 · · · an⇒ s, and s−b→ is not true for any b ∈ {b1, b2, . . . , bm, τ}.
The sets of traces, inﬁnite traces, divergence traces and stable failures of
an LTS L are denoted with Tr(L), Inftr(L), Divtr(L) and Sfail(L).
Deﬁnition 2.8 The Chaos-free failures divergences (CFFD) semantics [17] of
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L is the triple (Sfail(L), Divtr(L), Inftr(L)). 4 Two LTSs are CFFD-equivalent
if and only if they have the same CFFD-semantics and the same set of visible
actions.
The set Tr(L) is not included in the triple, because it can be uniquely
determined from the other components due to the formula Tr(L) = Divtr(L)∪
{σ | (σ, ∅) ∈ Sfail(L) } [17]. The set of deadlock traces is {σ | (σ,Σ) ∈
Sfail(L) }
CFFD-equivalence is a congruence with respect to parallel composition,
hiding and multiple renaming. Furthermore, strong bisimilarity implies CFFD-
equivalence; that is, L1 sb L2 ⇒ L1 CFFD L2.
CFFD-semantics contains enough information about the behaviour of the
system for the detection of deadlocks, livelocks and illegal actions or sequences
of actions, and for listing the traces after which the deadlock etc. may oc-
cur. What is more, it was shown in [6] that as long as the LTSs are ﬁnite,
any semantic model that (1) contains enough information for these tasks and
(2) induces a congruence with respect to the parallel composition and hiding
operators, must contain at least the same information as CFFD-semantics.
This means that CFFD-semantics does not contain more information than is
needed. This is very important for visual veriﬁcation, because it helps to keep
the graphical representations small.
In the absence of livelocks, CFFD-semantics coincides with the well-known
CSP-semantics of Brookes, Hoare and Roscoe [5,11]. In the presence of live-
locks, CFFD-semantics contains more information than CSP-semantics. In
CSP-semantics, livelocks are considered as catastrophic modes of behaviour
(and called “chaos”). Absolutely no information is preserved about the be-
haviour of a system that has passed through a potentially livelocking trace.
This feature makes CSP-semantics less useful for the veriﬁcation of a number
of systems, including the one used as an example in this article.
3 Visual Veriﬁcation
We illustrate visual veriﬁcation with the aid of the alternating bit protocol
that was shown in Figures 1 and 2. As we mentioned in Section 2.2, the
system as a whole is deﬁned by the formula
hide H in ( Sender ‖ Receiver ‖ Data channel ‖ Ack channel )
where H is the set of actions that we want to consider as internal to the
protocol.
ARA [14] is a tool that can be used, among other things, for computing
parallel composition and hiding of LTSs, and for reducing LTSs such that
4 It was originally also required that if one of the systems has a τ -transition that starts
in the initial state, then also the other should have. This requirement is needed to ensure
the congruence property with respect to the so-called choice operator that is common in
process algebras, but not used in this article.
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✏
✐ τ
Fig. 3. The externally observable behaviour of the alternating bit protocol.
CFFD-semantics is preserved. ARA contains also a visualisation tool that
can show small LTSs on a computer screen graphically in a fairly readable
(albeit not always elegant) manner. When ARA was told to construct an
LTS of the above model of the alternating bit protocol and then reduce and
visualise it, the result was — in essence — Figure 3. We have redrawn the
ﬁgures for this article, because the output of ARA is unsuitable for printing:
it relies on colours and consumes space uneconomically.
We can make a number of observations from Figure 3. First, send and rec
alternate, meaning that a message cannot be delivered before a message is
sent, and the protocol does not accept a new message for transmission before
the previous one has been delivered. Because each state has at least one
output transition, we also see that the protocol cannot deadlock. 5
On the other hand, the two τ -loops in the ﬁgure imply that the protocol
can livelock. Since the channels are unreliable, and Sender contains no upper
limit to the number of times it tries to transmit a message if it receives no
acknowledgement, it is natural to guess that the livelocks are due to systematic
loss of messages in the channels. Regarding the correctness of the protocol,
this explanation of the livelocks would be acceptable, because no protocol
can deliver messages if the channels are totally broken. Unfortunately, we do
not yet know if it is the only reason for the livelocks (or even a reason at
all); perhaps there is also a genuine error that causes livelocks even when the
channels work well?
We can, fortunately, check this. Each “acceptable” livelock contains in-
ﬁnitely many losses of messages, so livelocks should go away if we make lose d
and lose a visible, that is, remove them from H. The result of doing this is
shown in Figure 4. This LTS contains no τ -loops, so the protocol does not
have illegal livelocks. Figure 4 is, however, quite complicated. The reason is
that now that lose d and lose a are visible, all their possible orderings relative
to each other and to send and rec are shown, although we need them only
where the livelocks were in the previous picture. The next section presents a
new method that solves this problem.
5 The presence of a τ -transition from the end state of the rec-transition to the initial
state, and the absence of a similar transition at the start state of the rec-transition, are
explained by the fact that Sender only stops sending data messages after it receives an
acknowledgement. On the other hand, it cannot receive an acknowledgement before the
rec-transition, because Receiver sends it only after the rec-transition.
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Fig. 4. The alternating bit protocol with lose d and lose a visible.
4 Use of Context-Sensitive Visibility
The basic idea of our new method is to make chosen actions visible for only a
part of the behaviour of the system. The user speciﬁes this part by choosing
a set of states from the original visualised LTS, that is, the LTS where the
chosen actions are hidden everywhere. An automatic tool then produces an
LTS that is semantically otherwise like the original LTS, but occurrences of
the chosen actions are now visible (at least) in the part that the user selected.
Before we explain the theory and implementation of context-sensitive vis-
ibility in the next section, we illustrate in this section how the user sees it.
4.1 Livelocks in the Protocol
Figure 5 shows the result of making lose d visible in the ordinary sense (that
is, visible everywhere), and lose a visible in the end state of the rec-transition
in Figure 3. To emphasize that not all lose a-transitions are shown, those that
are shown are labelled with lose avis.
The τ -loop at the start state of the rec-transition has been replaced with
a lose d-loop, so the reason for its existence indeed was an inﬁnite number of
losses of messages in Data channel. If only a ﬁnite number of messages is lost,
then the system can execute lose d only a ﬁnite number of times, and it must
thus eventually execute rec. The τ -loop at the end state of the rec-transition
has been replaced with a loop starting with τ and ending with either lose d
or lose avis. This means that the original τ -loop had two diﬀerent (although
not mutually exclusive) causes: an inﬁnite number of losses of messages in
Data channel, and an inﬁnite number of losses of messages in Ack channel.
It was thus possible — and actually quite easy — to check from Figure 5
that there are no illegal livelocks. The simplicity of Figure 5 compared to
Figure 4 demonstrates the beneﬁt of context-sensitive visibility.
That Figure 5 has essentially the same structure as Figure 3 is good luck;
the method does not try to preserve the structure. The method tries to make
the resulting LTS small, and it succeeded very well in this example.
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◗◗ ✐
❍❍❍❥send ✐✟
✟✟✯rec
❇✂✍
lose d
✐ ✲τ✛ τ ✐
✏✏✏✮
lose d
✏✏✏✐
lose avis
Fig. 5. The alternating bit protocol with lose d visible everywhere and lose a con-
text-sensitively visible.
The user would no doubt try other combinations before deciding to make
lose d visible everywhere and lose a only in the chosen state. This is not a
problem since, thanks to computer tools, an unsuccessful attempt does not
take much time or eﬀort, and often gives hints for the next attempt.
4.2 Further Analysis
We note from Figure 5 that the state where the lose avis-transition starts is
actually rather curious. When the protocol is in this state, it can continue
only by losing either a data message or an acknowledgement. This suggests
that if the channels were made reliable by removing the lose d-transitions from
Data channel and lose a-transitions from Ack channel, then the protocol could
deadlock.
A more detailed analysis (performed with tools and techniques that are
not a topic of the present article) shows that after executing, for example,
send sd0 rd0 rec τ sd0 τ sa0 rd0 sd0 τ , the protocol is in a situation where each
channel contains a message, and both Sender and Receiver are ready to send
but not ready to receive a message. Sending is not possible, however, because
the channels are already full. Thus the protocol cannot continue before a data
or acknowledgement message is lost by a channel. With reliable channels it
would be in a deadlock.
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Fig. 6. The correct alternating bit protocol.
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Alt bit proto
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(a)
Alt bit proto
❆
❆❦ ✲send ❦
τ
❄
lose d
❇❇ ✂✂✌
❦
✻
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✂✂ ❇❇3
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(b)
Fig. 7. The behaviour of the correct alternating bit protocol (a) with loss of messages
visible all the time, and (b) with lose a context-sensitively visible.
The above is an example of a subtle error that is easily ignored in ordinary
veriﬁcation. It is not apparent in Figure 3, because the model of channels we
have used until now is such that if nothing else can happen, then the channel
is guaranteed to lose the message in it, and therefore no deadlock arises. On
the other hand, a reliable channel does not have this nice property of losing
messages when the protocol would otherwise deadlock.
In brief, our model of channels is incorrect in a way that hides an error
in the protocol. Ordinary veriﬁcation of properties such as “messages are not
duplicated” and “if only a ﬁnite number of messages is lost, then each send
is eventually followed by rec” cannot reveal the error, because the system as
a whole has these properties. We found the error because Figure 5 gave us
some information we did not ask for, namely that the protocol has a state
where it may only execute lose d or lose a. This is an example of the ability of
visual veriﬁcation to point out errors whose possibility is easily ignored when
writing a requirement speciﬁcation.
To ﬁx the protocol, we add transitions to Sender that consume all unex-
pected messages. We also change the channels such that they can commit
to not lose the message. The ﬁxed protocol is shown in Figure 6, and its
behaviour in Figure 7. The behaviour seems correct. The τ -transitions imme-
diately before the rec-transition might seem surprising: does not Sender keep
on sending data messages until it receives an acknowledgement from Receiver,
which cannot happen before the rec-transition? The answer is that yes, it tries
to do that. However, if the channel decides enough many times (twice, to be
precise) to deliver a message, then eventually a situation is reached where
Sender cannot send any more messages because the data channel is full, while
Receiver is ready for rec.
When we made the same analyses by using data and acknowledgement
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channels of capacity 2 in the protocol, we found that the pictures where lose a
is visible everywhere, Figures 4 and 7 (a), became more complicated, but
the pictures where lose a is context-sensitively visible, Figures 5 and 7 (b),
remained the same. 6
5 Theory of Context-Sensitive Visibility
5.1 Correctness
In this section we will describe how an LTS is made where some action a is
context-sensitively visible, and then formulate and prove two of its properties.
The properties state that the LTS is, in a certain precise sense, “between”
the LTS where a is visible everywhere, and the original LTS where a is hid-
den everywhere. It would suﬃce for our purposes to state and prove these
properties in terms of CFFD-semantics. In this case, however, it is natural
and easy to prove a much stronger result, namely that the properties hold
also when strong bisimilarity is used in their deﬁnition. This implies immedi-
ately the corresponding results for CFFD, because strong bisimilarity implies
CFFD-equivalence, as was mentioned in Section 2.4.
Let us assume that we are analysing the system Sys = hide a in L, where
L can be any (ﬁnite) LTS. In a typical case, as in the protocol example above,
L has been constructed through parallel composition from subprocesses and,
after hiding actions (other than a), reduced according to our equivalence. We
would now like to make the action a visible in some states of the system.
Context-sensitive visibility is based on (1) introducing two new action names
avis and ainv that are not in ΣL; (2) constructing a special switch process W
from Sys , avis, ainv and a list of states where a should be visible; and (3) then
producing the following LTS:
Csv = hide ainv in (W ‖ L[{avis, ainv}/a])
We will describe the actual construction of W in the next section. In this
section we will formulate and prove the correctness of Csv . To do that we need
to know that W has certain special properties. These properties are listed in
the next deﬁnition, which says that the alphabet of W is obtained by adding
avis and ainv to the alphabet of Sys ; each trace of the original LTS leads to
precisely one state of W ; W does not have τ -transitions; each state has either
an avis- or an ainv-transition to itself, but not both; and there are no other avis-
or ainv-transitions.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Let L be an LTS with ΣL as its alphabet, and let a ∈ ΣL, but
avis /∈ ΣL and ainv /∈ ΣL. Let Sys = hide a in L. An LTS (SW ,ΣW ,∆W , sˆW )
is a switch for L and a if and only if
6 We thank the anonymous referees for the idea of trying the case study with increased
channel capacities.
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Fig. 8. (a) An example L/Sys (a-transitions/τ -transitions), (b) a correspondingW ,
and (c) the corresponding Csv
• ΣW = ΣSys ∪ {avis, ainv}
• ∀σ ∈ Tr(Sys) : ∃sσ ∈ SW : sˆW =σ⇒ sσ.
Furthermore, if sˆW =σ⇒ s1 and sˆW =σ⇒ s2, then s1 = s2.
• ∀s ∈ SW : ¬(s−τ→ )
• ∀s ∈ SW : (s−avis→ s ∨ s−ainv→ s) ∧ ¬(s−avis→ ∧ s−ainv→ )
• ∀s, s′ ∈ SW : s−avis→ s′ ∨ s−ainv→ s′ ⇒ s′ = s
The ﬁrst correctness criterion says that if we hide again what has been
made context-sensitively visible, then what we get is CFFD-equivalent to the
original Sys . In fact, it is strongly bisimilar.
Theorem 5.2 hide avis in Csv sb Sys
Proof. The claim is hide avis in hide ainv in (W ‖ L[{avis, ainv}/a]) sb
hide a in L. Let Sys ′ = hide avis in Csv . By Deﬁnitions 2.3, 2.4, 2.6 and 5.1
we see that ΣSys′ = ΣW ∪ ΣL[{avis,ainv}/a] − {ainv} − {avis} = ΣSys ∪ {avis, ainv} ∪
(ΣL−{a})∪{avis, ainv}−{avis, ainv} = ΣSys ∪ (ΣL−{a}) = ΣSys . Furthermore,
Sys has the same states as L, and the states of Sys ′ are of the form (sW , sL),
where sW is a state of W and sL is a state of L. Let “∼” ⊆ SSys′ × SSys be
the relation such that (sW , sL1) ∼ sL2 holds if and only if sL1 = sL2. Clearly,
sˆSys′ ∼ sˆSys . The τ -transitions of L on either side simulate each other, and
whatever else L can do, W can participate in it, either because of its avis-
and ainv-transitions or because of the existence of the unique states sσ for
each trace σ of Sys = hide a in L. Furthermore, all transitions of W are
participated by L. Thus, both processes can simulate every transition of the
other process, which proves that the relation is a strong bisimulation. ✷
A natural next claim could be that Csv — or a process strongly bisimilar to
it — can be obtained by converting some a-transitions of L to avis-transitions,
and the remaining a-transitions to τ -transitions. This is not true, however,
as the example in Figure 8 demonstrates. We want to make a visible at the
middle state of Sys in Figure 8 (a), and invisible elsewhere. However, if the
ﬁrst a-transition of L is converted to τ , then no state of the result can execute
both b and avis, so no state can simulate the second state of Csv in Figure 8
(c). On the other hand, if the ﬁrst a-transition is converted to avis, then the
result cannot simulate the initial τ -transition of Csv .
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What is true, however, is that there is an LTS that is strongly bisimilar to
L, and from which Csv can be obtained by renaming and hiding a-transitions.
Theorem 5.3 Let L′ = (W ‖ L[{avis, ainv}/a])[{a}/avis][{a}/ainv].
• Csv can be obtained from L′ by hiding some a-transitions, and renaming
the remaining a-transitions to avis.
• L′ sb L
Proof. The ﬁrst claim follows directly from the deﬁnitions, if we hide those
a-transitions that were created from ainv-transitions with the “[{a}/ainv]”-
operator, and rename the remaining a-transitions to avis. A proof of the second
claim is obtained from the proof of Theorem 5.2 by replacing L′ and L for Sys ′
and Sys , respectively, and making trivial changes to the formulae giving the
alphabets and to the labels of transitions that originate from a-transitions of
L. ✷
5.2 Constructing the Switch
Let Svis ⊆ SSys be the set of the states of Sys where the user wanted a to
be visible. For every σ ∈ Σ∗Sys let sσ = {s ∈ SSys | sˆSys =σ⇒ s}. Intuitively,
the switch W is obtained from Sys by converting it to a deterministic LTS,
and adding to each state an avis- or ainv-loop depending on whether the user
wanted a to be visible in any original state contained in the deterministic state.
The idea of the loops is that while the switch process remains in this state,
it allows the target process to execute freely the chosen action but blocks it
from executing the alternative action. Formally, the switch W is the following
LTS:
• SW = { sσ | σ ∈ Tr(Sys) }
• ΣW = ΣSys ∪ {avis, ainv}
• ∆W = { (sσ, b, sσb) | σb ∈ Tr(Sys) } ∪ { (sσ, avis, sσ) | sσ ∩ Svis = ∅ } ∪
{ (sσ, ainv, sσ) | sσ ∩ Svis = ∅ }
• sˆW = sε
Sys is made deterministic with the well-known subset construction that can
be found in any textbook on ﬁnite automata or compilers, for example [9,1].
It is important to notice that despite the subset construction this operation
is not costly, because we are not using the complete state space of the system
but the abstracted, reduced version that in any case has to be small enough
for visual veriﬁcation.
It is possible that sσ contains a state from Svis and another state from
outside Svis. In that case, W may make a visible even if Sys is in a state
where the user did not request a to be visible. The visibility of a depends
only on the trace executed by Sys so far. This is the sense mentioned in the
introduction in which our new method may show more than the user asked
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Fig. 9. The switch process.
for. The user can never lose any information, but the ﬁnal LTS can become
larger than would be absolutely necessary.
The switch used in the protocol example is shown in Figure 9.
6 Conclusions
We presented a method for making an action visible in some parts of an LTS
and invisible in other parts. The method is based on duplicating the action in
question into a visible and invisible version, and constructing a special switch
process that chooses which version of the action may occur. The invisible
version is then hidden, and the visible version is shown.
As the example in this paper demonstrates, context-sensitive visibility can
improve visual veriﬁcation. It reduces the size of the LTS that is shown, while
still providing the information that the user wanted.
The implementation of context-sensitive visibility is not at all diﬃcult.
Multiple renaming and the adding of self-loop transitions are straightforward
operations, and hiding, parallel composition and determinisation already exist
in many LTS manipulation tools, including ARA. The method is also compu-
tationally cheap, because it is performed on an abstracted, reduced version of
the system instead of the complete state space.
The method can perhaps be improved by minimising the switch before
use. This issue is not trivial, however, because the last two conditions of
Deﬁnition 5.1 are not preserved by strong bisimilarity. Another hypothesis
is that the method can be used to make several actions context-sensitively
visible simultaneously. We plan to investigate these hypotheses in the future.
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